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Over the last decades, companies’ average profit margins have been decreasing and as a result efficiency 
of  transportation  processes  has  become  critical.  To  cut  down  transportation  costs,  shippers  often 
outsource  their  transportation  activities  to  a  Logistics  Service  Provider  of  their  choice.  This  paper 
proposes a procedure that puts the initiative with the service provider instead. This procedure is based on 
both operations research and game theoretical insights. To stress the contrast between the traditional 
push approach of outsourcing, and the here proposed pull approach where the service provider is the 
initiator of the shift of logistics activities from the shipper to the Logistics Service Provider, we will refer to 
this phenomenon as insinking, the antonym of outsourcing. Insinking has the advantage that the logistics 
service provider can proactively select a group of shippers with a strong synergy potential. Moreover, 
these synergies can be allocated to the participating shippers in a fair and sustainable way by means of 
customized tariffs. Insinking is illustrated by means of a case study in the Dutch grocery transportation 
sector. 
 
Keywords:  Insinking,  Cooperative  Game  Theory,  Shapley  Monotonic  Path,  Retail,  Vehicle  Routing, 
Logistics Service Providers 
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1  Introduction 
 
A Logistics Service Provider (LSP) is defined as a provider of logistics services that performs logistics 
functions on behalf of his customers (cf. Coyle et al. (1996)). In recent years, LSPs have had to cope with 
stricter requirements of shippers in terms of speed, flexibility and price. In addition, because of broader 
product  assortments  and  shorter  life  cycles,  streams  through  the  LSPs’  networks  became  highly 
fragmented. This causes load factors and, by consequence, profit margins to drop. To cope with these 
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heavy market conditions, LSPs are on a continuous search for opportunities to increase their efficiency 
and discern themselves from competitors (cf. Langley et al. (2005)). 
 
1.1  Insinking versus Outsourcing 
Razzaque and Sheng (1998) define logistics outsourcing or third party logistics as the provision of a 
single or multiple logistics services by a vendor on a contractual basis. It has been estimated that about 
40%  of  global  logistics  is  outsourced,  and  increasing  numbers  of  shippers  consider  it  an  attractive 
alternative to the traditional logistics service mode (cf. Wong et al. (2000); Hong et al. (2004)). 
 
For their turnover, LSPs heavily depend on the extent to which industrial shippers outsource their logistics 
activities.  Wilding  and  Juriado  (2004)  provide  a  literature  review  of  empirical  papers  on  outsourcing, 
investigating which activities are typically outsourced and what are the most important reasons for doing 
so. Table 1 shows the top-5 reasons for outsourcing.  
 
Rank  Reason 
1  Cost or revenue related 
2  Service related 
3  Operational flexibility related 
4  Business focus related 
5  Asset utilization or efficiency related 
Table 1: Reasons for outsourcing logistics activities 
 
The outsourced activities can be related to Transportation and Shipment, Warehousing and Inventory, 
Information Systems and Value Added Services. It turns out that the most basic logistics functions of 
transportation, warehousing and inventory are outsourced most frequently.  
 
The general idea behind outsourcing is a focus of companies on their core businesses. For example, 
customers  of  an  LSP  benefit  from  the  LSP’s  larger  economies  of  scale  that  enable  him  to  perform 
transportation  and  warehousing  more  efficiently  than  his  customers.  Traditionally,  the  initiative  for 
outsourcing lies with the shippers: once it is reckoned by management that logistics activities can better 
be performed by a third party, an invitation to submit a tender is sent out to a number of pre-selected 
LSPs. Based on this invitation, the LSPs then propose a price for their services. 
 
The subject of this paper is the reverse mode of operation, where the initiative for the contract lies with 
the  LSP.  To  stress  the  contrast  between  the  traditional  push  approach  of  outsourcing,  and  the  here   3 
proposed pull approach where the service provider is the initiator of the shift of logistics activities from 
the shipper to the LSP, we will refer to this phenomenon as insinking, the antonym of outsourcing. 
 
The advantage of insinking over outsourcing is that it enables LSPs to gain maximum synergetic effects 
by  tendering  for  multiple  shippers  whose  distribution  networks  can  be  merged  very  efficiently.  We 
observe that there exist promising business opportunities for insinking in practice. One example is the 
introduction of the so-called transport-arrangements in the Dutch Randstad metropolis. In this project, a 
Dutch LSP offers prominent shippers in the fashion sector to perform the distribution to their shops in the 
city centers against very sharp tariffs. These tariffs are low because of the strong synergies the LSP can 
benefit from in case he replenishes multiple fashion outlets in the same city center. The Dutch branch 
organization for fashion companies, actively participates in this project by stimulating their members to 
accept the offer. Engaging in the transport-arrangements project is beneficial for the individual producers 
because transportation costs are reduced and customer satisfaction is likely to increase since the number 
of visits per shop decreases when multiple shippers make use of the transport-arrangements. As a result, 
trucks interrupt store personnel less frequently. Moreover, congestion in the city center will decrease as a 
result of the smaller number of vehicle movements. Apart from the time investments that all partners in 
this project are making, the financial risk rests solely with the LSP. After all, the tariff offers are based on 
the expectation that a certain minimum number of shippers will participate. So when only 1 or 2 shippers 
accept  the  offer,  the  required  synergies  to  break  even  may  not  be  attained.  When  the  behavior  of 
potential customers is highly unpredictable, this risk might be prohibitive for the LSP. To resolve this 
issue, this paper offers a methodology for LSPs to apply insinking while eliminating this financial risk. 
 
1.2  Co-opetition 
Shippers who are active in the same sector, such as the fashion producers in the transport-arrangements 
example, will sell products with roughly the same characteristics and ordering dynamics (time windows, 
order sizes, conditioning, etc). This creates strong synergy potential for an LSP, because he can operate 
the same truck types and sometimes even the same routes to service multiple shippers. When shippers 
are served on the same route, insinking creates a situation of so-called ‘co-opetition’ (cf. Brandenburger 
and  Nalebuff  (1996)  and  Zineldin  (2004)).  Although  the  shippers  are  competitors  on  their  core 
businesses, they tacitly cooperate with each other on the non-core domain of transportation since they 
agree  that  their  products  are  distributed  in  a  single  shipment  with  their  competitors’  products. 
Transportation, the area where the cooperation takes place, is not visible to customers. Bengtsson and 
Kock  (2000)  consider  visibility  for  the  customer  as  the  most  important  characteristic  for  determining 
whether  competition  or  cooperation  should  take  place  on  a  certain  activity.  For  example,  if  there  is 
cooperation on transportation activities, competition and differentiation can remain unchanged on other   4 
domains such as product prices and product assortments. Bengtsson and Kock (1999) state that co-
opetition must not be seen as dangerous. Instead, top management should understand and communicate 
to organizational members that cooperation and competition can be applied simultaneously, and both can 
contribute to achieving organizational goals. Particularly in transportation and logistics, where there are 
almost no unique technologies, companies must often rely on applying innovative concepts such as co-
opetition  to  achieve  growth.  In  practice,  co-opetition  is  quickly  gaining  momentum  in  the  grocery 
industry. In this sector profit margins are thin and demand variation is strong. Examples of co-opetition in 
the consumer goods industry can be found in Bahrami (2003), and LeBlanc et al. (2005). 
 
Since cooperation takes place among (potential) competitors, by the definition of Piercy and Cravens 
(1994), insinking is an example of horizontal cooperation. Unfortunately, no formal large-scale research 
has  been  done  on  the  views  of  shippers  about  horizontal  cooperation  with  regard  to  their  logistics 
activities.  However,  the  views  of  LSPs  are  better  identified  and  can  provide  useful  insights  into  the 
industry opinion on this subject. Carbone and Stone (2005) state that horizontal cooperation between 
LSPs is mainly aimed at one of three objectives:  
(i)  Strengthening the present geographical network,  
(ii)  Developing new competencies, and  
(iii)  Penetrating new geographical markets.  
 
They also give four practical examples of horizontal cooperation between major European LSPs. There 
are however important barriers that can prevent initiatives from prospering. In Cruijssen et al. (2005) 
nine potential impediments for horizontal cooperation are presented to Flemish LSPs. Table 2 presents 
the evaluations of these impediments (5-point Likert scale). 
 
  Impediment  Avg  Std dev 
1  A fair allocation of the benefits is essential for a successful cooperation.  4.11  0.84 
2  It is hard to find a reliable party that can coordinate the cooperation in such a way that all participants 
are satisfied. 
4.00  0.87 
3  Smaller companies in the partnership may lose customers or get pushed out of the market completely.  3.95  1.01 
4  It is hard to find commensurable LSPs with whom it is possible to cooperate for (non-) core activities.  3.84  0.96 
5  It is hard to ensure a fair allocation of the shared workload in advance.  3.73  0.89 
6  Benefits cannot be shared in a fair way; the larger players will always benefit most.  3.60  1.19 
7  It is hard to determine the benefits or operational savings due to horizontal cooperation beforehand.  3.54  0.89 
8  When an LSP cooperates with commensurable companies, it becomes harder to distinguish itself.  3.52  0.90 
9  Cooperation is greatly hampered by the required indispensable ICT-investments.  3.43  0.97 
Table 2: Impediments for horizontal cooperation (1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, and 
5=strongly agree)   5 
 
1.3  Gain Sharing 
Because impediments for LSPs will supposedly also hold for horizontal cooperation among shippers, we 
assume that the evaluations by the LSPs provide an indication for the attitude of shippers. Table 2 shows 
that the impediments about the fairness and stability of cooperation (impediments 1, 3, 5, and 6) rank 
high.  In  particular,  guaranteeing  a  fair  allocation  of  the  achieved  benefits  is  the  most  important 
impediment for horizontal cooperation. 80% of the respondents (strongly) agreed with this proposition, 
16% was neutral, and as little as 4% (strongly) disagreed. Mistrust about the fairness of the applied 
allocation  rule  for  the  savings  has  caused  many  horizontal  logistics  cooperation  initiatives  among 
shippers, and/or LSPs to marginalize or disintegrate. 
 
In practice, a plethora of allocation rules for horizontal cooperation among shippers can be observed. 
Most often these are simple rules of thumb that distribute savings proportionally to a single indicator of 
either size or contribution to the synergy. Some examples are: 
•  Proportional to the total load shipped 
•  Proportional to the number of customers served 
•  Proportional to the transportation costs before the cooperation 
•  Proportional to distance traveled for each shipper’s orders 
-  based on inter-drop distances of constructed joint routes 
-  based on direct distances from depot to outlet 
•  Proportional to the number of orders 
 
Because  these  rules  are  easy  and  transparent  and  since  each  embodies  a  construct  that  arguably 
represents the importance of an individual shipper to the group, they are likely to appeal to practitioners 
initially. However, when using a single construct, the others are obviously disregarded. In the long run, 
some  participants  will  inevitably  get  frustrated  since  their  true  share  in  the  group’s  success  is 
undervalued. For example, if gain sharing takes place according to the number of drop points of each 
participant, a certain shipper who delivers a large number of drop points in a small geographical region 
will get a large share of the benefits, while his de facto contribution to the attained synergy is negligible 
when the other participants serve only few drop points in this area. 
 
To ensure a fair gain sharing mechanism, the marginal contributions of each shipper to the total gain 
have  to  be  accurately  quantified.  The  insinking  approach  uses  the  true  contributions  to  the  group’s 
synergy to calculate customized prices that fairly distribute the monetary savings that are attained by   6 
consolidating flows of multiple shippers. In our approach, the applied methodology is explained to the 
shippers and the LSP’s cost structure is deliberately made transparent. 
 
It is illustrated above that practical rules of thumb might not always be the best choice for fair gain 
sharing.  Our  proposal  is  to  employ  solution  procedures  from  cooperative  game  theory  instead. 
Cooperative game theory models the negotiation process within a group of cooperating agents (in this 
case shippers) and allocates the generated savings. This field has proved capable of solving fairness 
issues  in  many  fields.  Some  logistics  related  examples  are:  (Vertical)  Supply  Chain  Coordination  (cf. 
Cachon and Lariviere (2005)), Hub-and-Spoke network formation (cf. Matsubayashi et al. (2005)), and 
Outsourcing (cf. Elitzur and Wensley (1997)). Other sectors where game theoretical methods have been 
successfully  applied  in  practice  include  among  others:  Automotive  (cf.  Cachon  and  Lariviere  (1999)), 
Retail (cf. Sayman et al. (2002)), Telecommunication (cf. van den Nouweland et al. (1996)), Aviation (cf. 
Adler (2001)), and Health Care (cf. Ford et al. (2004)). Cooperating companies in these sectors benefit 
from game theoretical methods that objectively take into account each player’s impact within the group 
as a whole and produce compromise allocations that distribute the benefits of cooperation based on clear 
cut fairness properties. Different fairness properties are represented by well-known allocation rules such 
as  the  Shapley  value  (Shapley  (1953)),  the  nucleolus  (Schmeidler  (1969))  and  the  tau-value  (Tijs 
(1981)). As will become clear in the remainder of this paper, cooperative game theory offers a solution to 
the four gain sharing related impediments for horizontal logistics cooperation in Table 2. 
 
1.4  Price Setting 
With the insinking procedure, the LSP establishes fair gain sharing by means of customized pricing. This 
enables  the  LSP  to  explicitly  incorporate  participants’  marginal  contributions  to  the  group’s  synergy 
potential.  The  business  opportunities  offered  by  intelligent  pricing  strategies  are  being  increasingly 
recognized in Marketing (cf. Desiraju and Shugan (1999)) and Psychology (cf. Hermann et al. (2004)). 
The advent of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in the last decade has opened up a vast 
array  of  new  pricing  possibilities  (cf.  Dixit  et  al.  (2005)).  The  most  important  challenge  of  such 
information  enhanced  pricing  strategies  is  to  be  perceived  by  customers  as  fair.  Perceived  fairness 
depends on comparisons to past prices, competitor prices, and perceived cost of the product or service 
(cf.  Bolton  et  al.  (2003)).  Although  these  factors  come  from  a  Business-to-Consumer  setting,  we 
hypothesize that the same constructs are relevant for the Business-to-Business situation that we consider 
in this paper. 
 
An important aspect of fair pricing is the principle of dual entitlement (cf. Kahnemann et al. (1986)). This 
means that a profit increase by the selling firm (the LSP) is only accepted when it does not harm the   7 
customer’s interest. This egalitarian principle sometimes conflicts with the utilitarian principle of cost-
based pricing. Under cost-based pricing, an LSP will charge the total costs plus a ‘reasonable’ percentage. 
Dixit  et  al.  (2005)  argue  that  dissatisfaction  about  fairness  of  prices  could  be  avoided  by  proper 
implementation  and  communication  of  price  composition.  Therefore,  openness  of  information  is  an 
important aspect of insinking and, as will become clear in the next section, both the egalitarian and 
utilitarian principles mentioned above are satisfied.  
 
Despite its obvious business opportunities, only few firms take full advantage of intelligent pricing. The 
vast majority still uses pricing strategies based on historical cost benchmarks, whereas more forward-
looking  and  clientele-oriented  pricing  is  likely  to  be  more  promising  (cf.  Noble  and  Gruca  (1999)). 
Especially in the  very competitive and low-margin transportation sector, smart pricing offers  LSPs an 
excellent opportunity to gain a competitive edge. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section the insinking procedure  for 
exploiting synergy in transportation will be explained and illustrated by means of a small hypothetical 
example. In section 3, the applicability of the procedure is established by a real life case study in the 
Dutch grocery transportation sector. Finally section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2  The Insinking Procedure 
 
The insinking procedure builds on customized pricing by an LSP. These prices (or: tariffs) are induced by 
the varying claims of shippers’ order sets on the LSP’s resources. Among other properties, order sets may 
differ in the number of orders, the geographical spread of the drop points, the location of the shipper’s 
warehouse(s), the tightness of time windows, and the average and standard deviation of the order sizes. 
In Cruijssen and Salomon (2004) it is shown that each of these aspects has a clear influence on the 
synergy potential when the order sets are combined. In this section we introduce the insinking procedure 
by describing its three steps:  
(i)  Target group selection, 
(ii)  Cost reductions, and 
(iii)  Negotiation and structure of sequential offers. 
   8 
2.1  Target group selection 
As a first step, the LSP has to select the group of shippers he wishes to serve. It was argued above that 
opting for a group of shippers from the same industry comes at the advantage of having similar product 
characteristics and ordering dynamics. It also fits in the current trend of (sectoral) specialization in the 
logistics sector: having multiple customers in e.g. the chemical, consumer electronics, paper or textile 
sector strengthens the market position of an LSP and offers a safeguard for future survival.  
 
Three necessary ingredients of successful market targeting are: information, the LSP’s capabilities and 
synergy. The first two provide the prerequisites. First, the LSP must have enough market information to 
assess its chances to obtain the required amount of contracts. In some cases this information is publicly 
available,  such  as  in  the  grocery  case  discussed  in  section  3,  but  for  other  markets  obtaining  this 
information  will  require  a  more  thorough  market  analysis.  The  second  condition  is  the  good  match 
between  the  market  and  the  LSP’s  capabilities.  For  example,  if  an  LSP’s  past  experience  involves 
predominantly unconditioned palletized transportation, it might not be advisable to target the specialized 
petrochemical  industry.  When  market  info  is  available  and  the  LSP  has  the  capabilities  to  serve  the 
market, the attractiveness of a target group depends on the synergy potential that exists between them. 
Gupta and Gerchak (2002) have studied operational synergies for mergers and acquisitions, which can be 
seen as an upper bound for the synergy under horizontal cooperation. In this paper we assume that the 
LSP is able to make a reliable estimate of the monetary synergy potential, which we define as the sum of 
the costs that individual shippers make in the present situation minus the costs when the whole set of 
shippers would be serviced collectively by the LSP. Besides these operational considerations however, 
often also relational issues play an important role. For example, it may be the case that an LSP already 
has (informal) contacts with a coherent group of shippers of whom he knows they are interested in the 
service. Although this group may not be optimal from a synergy perspective, this may be outweighed by 
the group’s cohesion and their established contacts with the LSP. In fact, applying an innovative concept 
such as insinking requires a considerable amount of trust between the LSP and the shippers, which will 
benefit from positive past business experiences. 
 
2.2  Cost reductions 
When the LSP has identified the group of shippers targeted, he is ready to calculate the cost reductions 
for each of the shippers involved. Since we use cooperative game theory in this step, we first recall some 
basic notions from game theory. Myerson (1991) defined game theory as “the study of mathematical 
models  of  conflict  and  cooperation  between  intelligent  and  rational  decision-makers.  Game  theory 
provides general mathematical techniques for analyzing situations in which two or more individuals make 
decisions that will influence one another’s welfare”.  Cooperative game theory  focuses on cooperative   9 
behavior by analyzing the negotiation process within a group of players in establishing a contract or joint 
plan of activities, including an allocation of collaboratively generated revenues. In particular, the possible 
levels of cooperation and the revenues of each possible coalition (a subgroup of the cooperating players) 
are taken into account so as to allow for a better comparison of each player’s role and impact within the 
group  as  a  whole.  In  this  way,  players  in  a  coalition  can  settle  on  a  compromise  allocation  in  an 
objectively  justifiable  way.  Having  this  in  mind,  the  game  underlying  the  insinking  methodology  is 
evidently a cooperative game. The problem of allocating the jointly generated synergy savings is critical 
to any logistics cooperation (cf. Table 2; Thun (2003)). 
 
Let N be a finite set of players and denote by 2
N the collection of all subsets of N. Elements of 2
N are 
called coalitions, N is the grand coalition. The cost savings that a coalition S  can jointly generate without 
the players in  S N \  is called the value of coalition S . The values of all coalitions S  are captured in the 
so-called  characteristic  function  :2
N v → ￿.  The  Shapley  value  (Shapley  (1953))  is  a  well-known 
solution concept that constructs an allocation vector  ( , )
N N v Φ ∈￿ that allocates the value  ( ) v N  of the 
grand coalition based on the values  ) (S v of all coalitions  S . The idea behind the Shapley value is that, 
when the grand coalition N is formed one by one, each player i  upon entering an (intermediate) coalition 
S  will demand  ( ) ( ) S v i S v − ∪ } {  as a fair compensation. These so-called marginal contributions are 
then averaged over all permutations of N, representing all orderings in which the grand coalition N can be 
formed. This idea boils down to the following formula: 
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The Shapley value can also be motivated by a number of fairness properties. Below we will briefly discuss 
four of these properties that are useful in our context. First, the efficiency property of the Shapley value 
ensures that the total value of the grand coalition is distributed among the players, i.e., no value is lost.   10 
The Shapley is also symmetric, meaning that two players that create the same additional value to any 
coalition receive the same share of the total value. The dummy property states that players that do not 
contribute anything to any coalition except their individual value indeed receive exactly their individual 
value as a  final share of  the total value. Finally, we mention the Shapley  value’s property  of  strong 
monotonicity.  This  guarantees  that  the  payoff  of  a  player  can  only  increase  if  none  of  the  player’s 
marginal  contributions  decreases.  Since  these  four  properties  make  perfect  sense  from  a  practical 
perspective, we make use of the Shapley value in this paper.  
 
We are now ready to formulate the cooperative game, which forms the basis of the insinking procedure: 
the insinking game. In the current step, the LSP knows his target group of shippers (from now on called 
the players) and faces the problem of distributing the group’s synergy potential, i.e., the value  ( ) N v  of 
the grand coalition. 
 
In order to cover the extra overhead costs needed to service the players and to gain profit, the LSP 
claims a pre-determined percentage. This percent claim is called the synergy claim and is denoted by 
[ ] 1 , 0 ∈ p .  In  choosing  the  value  of  the  synergy  claim  the  LSP  faces  a  trade-off  between  a  higher 
prospected profit by setting p high, and a larger probability that the players will indeed cooperate by 
choosing  a  smaller  value.  The  LSP  can  make  this  decision  based  on  a  qualitative  assessment  of  his 
bargaining power in the market. 
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Here,  ( ) i C0  are the costs of player i  in the status quo situation, i.e., when player i  privately performs 
the distribution of his own goods, while  ( ) S C  represents the costs of the LSP to serve all players in  S  
collectively. Obviously, a coalition S  can only be established when the LSP can serve the players in S  at 
a lower cost than the sum of the costs that the players in  S  incur when they perform their own orders 
individually.  Whenever  this  it  not  the  case,  the  value  of  the  coalition  under  consideration  is  0.  This 
explains the use of the maximum with 0 in (3). 
 
We will illustrate the procedure by means of a hypothetical 3-player example, for which the relevant 
information is summarized in Table 3. For convenience of calculations, we assume that p=0.   11 
 
S   ( ) ∑
∈S i
i C0   ( ) S C   ( ) S v   ( ) v S, Φ  
{1)  350  300  50  (50; . ; . ) 
{2}  300  260  40  ( . ;40; . ) 
{3}  100  120  0  ( . ; . ;0) 
{1,2}  650  500  150  (80;70; . ) 
{1,3}  450  390  60  (55; . ;5) 
{2,3}  400  370  30  ( . ;35;-5) 
{1,2,3}  750  570  180  (95;75;10) 
Table 3: A hypothetical 3-player example 
 
The last column of Table 3 shows that cooperation between players 2 and 3 only will not occur since in 
this case both players receive a value that is lower than the value they would be able to get individually. 
 
2.3  Negotiation and structure of sequential offers 
Despite the fact that in our example all possible coalitions have a positive value, the LSP still has to select 
an effective way to establish the grand coalition. He does so by choosing the most suitable sequence in 
which he proposes offers to players. Every time a player from the selected target group is approached 
with such an offer, the method that the LSP will consistently use is clearly explained to this player. By 
communicating  openly,  the  player’s  involvement  in  the  project  increases  and  the  LSP  has  better 
possibilities to crosscheck the assumptions and data he used to calculate the proposals. Sequentially, a 
player  i  receives an opening offer based on  {} ( ) v i S i , ∪ Φ , if  S  is the coalition of players that have 
already committed before. Moreover, it is explained to player i  that his offer may further improve when 
more players consign to the LSP’s service. These reductions are also announced to the player, together 
with the accompanying scenarios for commitment of the players that are not yet contacted. Figure 1 
graphically shows the offered percentage cost reductions with respect to the costs of in-house execution 
by the players. We use the percentage reduction of the current costs of the players rather than the 














Figure 1: Percentage cost reductions in the 3-player example 
  
 
In the example above, when players are contacted in the sequence 123, during the negotiations player 1 
knows that he is sure to save 50 (14.3%), and that his cost reduction will increase to 80 (22.9%) if later 
on player 2 consigns, and even to 95 (27.1%) if besides player 2 also player 3 commits. Together, the 
opening offer and the prospected future cost reductions should persuade the player to accept the offer. 
 
Based on Figure 1, the LSP has to decide the actual sequence in which he contacts the players (i.e., the 
path through Figure 1). Compared to a simultaneous approach, the one-by-one modus operandi offers 
the benefit that the obtained commitment of one or more players leverages the value proposition that 
can be made to the remaining players, since a certain level of scale and synergy is already attained.  
 
The usage of a fixed synergy claim p makes that the LSP’s profit is maximized when the grand coalition is 
attained. Therefore, the LSP is interested in finding the path through Figure 1 that gives the highest 
“probability” that all players will accept his insinking offer. To this end, we introduce the notion of a 
Shapley Monotonic Path (SMP). Along such a path all committed players will be better off when the 
coalition grows through the decision of the next player to accept the insinking offer. In the example 
above, 123, 132, 213 and 312 are SMPs. The others are not because one player’s offer worsens during at 
least one of the steps. When the target group is carefully selected based on a strong synergy potential 
among the players, there will indeed exist SMPs. Note that the value of p does not affect the Shapley 
Monotonicity of paths. 
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If there are more SMPs, the next question becomes how to choose between them. For the hypothetical 
3-player example, the four SMPs together with the offered percentage cost reductions with respect to the 
present (in-house) cost are displayed in Figure 2. 
 
path 123 path 132
player 1 2 3 player 1 3 2
own costs 350 300 100 own costs 350 100 300
first 14,3% . . first 14,3% . .
second 22,9% 23,3% . second 15,7% 5,0% .
third 27,1% 25,0% 10,0% third 27,1% 10,0% 25,0%
path 213 path 312
player 2 1 3 player 3 1 2
own costs 300 350 100 own costs 100 350 300
first 13,3% . . first 0,0% . .
second 23,3% 22,9% . second 5,0% 15,7% .
third 25,0% 27,1% 10,0% third 10,0% 27,1% 25,0%
 
Figure 2: Example of possible sequential offers according to SMPs 
 
Although all four paths described in Figure 2 are SMPs, path 312 does not seem to be a reasonable 
choice for the LSP. This is because in the first step, player 3 is not offered a cost reduction because he 
can perform his own orders more efficiently individually than the LSP can. This is captured in the concept 
of first offer rationality: the first offer of the LSP to an entering player indeed represents a cost reduction 
compared to player’s status quo situation of performing the orders individually. SMPs that satisfy this 
criterion are referred to as Rational Shapley Monotonic Paths (RSMPs). In the remainder, we will restrict 
attention to RSMPs. 
 
There might be various ways to judge which RSMP is best from the LSP’s perspective of achieving the 
grand coalition. It seems reasonable however that the reductions on the diagonal and bottom row in 
Figure 2 are the most relevant considerations for players. The first correspond to the cost reductions that 
the players are guaranteed to achieve when accepting the offer (certain gain), and the second are the 
maximum possible cost reductions that are attained when the grand coalition is indeed achieved (top 
gain). 
 
One can argue that the relative importance of the certain gain and top gain depends on a player’s risk 
aversion. When risk aversion is very high the certain gains are most important, since the players will be 
sure of this reduction irrespective of the future decisions of other players further up the path. On the 
other hand, when risk aversion is low, the top gain is also an important concern for a player. Here we 
assume that risk aversion is high and we select an RSMP on the basis of the certain gains. Table 4 shows   14 
the  certain  gains  for  the  three  RSMPs.  Consequently,  we  propose  to  select  the  “best”  RSMP  in  the 
following way: first select those RSMPs that have the maximal lowest cost reduction. In our example, 
these are 123 and 213 with a lowest certain gain of 10%. Then, from those RSMPs, select the one that 
has the maximal second-lowest certain gain, etc. In our hypothetical example, 123 will be selected with a 
second-lowest certain gain of 14.3%. 
  
  Certain gain  Sorted certain gain 
Path  Player 1  Player 2  Player 3  Lowest  2
nd lowest  3
rd lowest 
123  14,3%  23,3%  10,0%  10,0%  14,3%  23,3% 
213  22,9%  13,3%  10,0%  10,0%  13,3%  22,9% 
132  14,3%  25,0%  5,0%  5,0%  14,3%  25,0% 
Table 4: RSMP selection based on certain gains 
 
This finishes our discussion of the insinking procedure. In the next section we illustrate the insinking 
procedure by means of a real world case study from the Dutch grocery transportation sector. 
 
 
3  Case study 
 
Many grocery retailers are not performing well and have been facing a loss of profitability in recent years. 
Together with the complexity and dynamism inherent to the grocery industry, this has made it difficult for 
retailers to survive in isolation of their competitors (cf. Ballou et al. (2000)). There is growing empirical 
evidence that retailers as a result turn to co-opetive behavior to construct win-win situations together 
with their competitors. For example, Kotzab and Teller (2003), present a case study in which the largest 
Austrian retailers cooperate in their logistics processes by introducing uniform load units and performing 
joint  replenishment.  This  cooperation  runs  parallel  to  fierce  price  competition  and  heavy  promotional 
spending.  In  this  section  we  present  a  co-opetive  insinking  case  study  that  results  in  considerable 
efficiency gains for retailers in the Dutch grocery transportation sector. For reasons of confidentiality, the 
company names in this case study are not disclosed. 
 
3.1  Background 
The case focuses around an LSP that has a large temperature controlled distribution center for frozen 
goods (FDC) in the geographical center of the Netherlands. Taking advantage of its established position 
in ambient food retail, the LSP’s goal is to fill this FDC with the frozen food products of grocery retailers,   15 
and perform the transportation from the FDC to their stores. Among other things, this means that in the 
new situation suppliers of frozen products must only visit the central FDC instead of the multiple FDCs of 
individual retailers, thereby reducing the number of drops that suppliers make on their delivery routes. As 
a side effect to the synergy attained in the retailers’ distribution process, this will increase the efficiency 
of the suppliers’ transportation process. 
  
The LSP applies the insinking procedure outlined in section 2 to attract a number of large and medium 
sized grocery retailers as his customers. Below we discuss how the three steps of the procedure can be 
applied here. 
 
3.2  Target group selection 
Table 5 shows some characteristics of four grocery retailers A,B,C, and D with whom the LSP maintains 
close contacts.  
 
Retailer  # Outlets  Weekly demand (roll pallets)  Yearly turnover (mln EURO)  Symbol in Figure 3 
A  37  17,366  367   
B  61  25,369  616   
C  63  18,634  373   
D  195  62,857  1,187   
Table 5: Characteristics of targeted retailers (2003) 
These retailers have the same (or at least a comparable) customer base and Figure 3 shows that their 
distribution networks have considerable geographical overlap. Furthermore, they have not yet outsourced 
their transportation activities to an LSP. All four retailers use a standardized roll pallet for shop deliveries, 
which makes it easy to consolidate loads of different retailers in one truck. The encouraging synergy 
potential, the existing contacts and the fact that the capacity of the FDC is sufficient to fulfill their orders, 
make that these four retailers form the LSP’s target group.   16 
 
Figure 3: Geographical overlap of stores of retailers 
 
3.3  Cost reductions 
In step 2 of the insinking procedure we calculate the value of all subcoalitions of {A,B,C,D}. The cost 
reduction that the LSP will be able to offer then depends on the synergy among the order sets of the 
retailers. Additionally, the offers are influenced by the LSP’s synergy claim. This claim must cover the 
extra administrative (back office) costs, the costs of storage at the central FDC, and profit. In this case 
study, the synergy claim is set to 0.2.  
 
Below we comment on the data and the routing problems that form the basis of the calculation of the 
cost reduction proposals. 
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Data 
Order data of the four retailers are estimated on the basis of the commercial surface of their stores and 
the average turnover of frozen products per square meter of commercial surface. The daily frequency of 
delivery per retailer is based on de Koster and Neuteboom (2001) and information from other industry 
experts. Based on these data five daily order sets are constructed, representing the working days in a 
typical week. 
  
By assumption, the trucks operated by the retailers and by the LSP all have a capacity of 57 roll pallets 
and a uniform cost structure. This cost structure is based on the published market averages for the 
Netherlands and consists of a fixed cost per truck per day of EURO 120 and a cost of EURO 0.33 per 
minute that a truck is driving or unloading at the store. The fixed costs are incorporated in the cost 
structure, because the retailers can dispose of the specialized temperature controlled trucks when the 
transportation of the frozen products is taken over by the LSP.  
 
Besides transportation costs, also the costs of operating an FDC are incorporated. In the Netherlands, 
storage of one roll pallet of frozen goods costs on average EURO 2.79 per week. These costs include 
handling, depreciation and cooling. Whereas they are fixed for the LSP, the retailers can eliminate these 
costs by accepting the LSP’s insinking offer. We assume that the FDCs of each retailer have a capacity 
equal to a week’s throughput of pallets. 
Routing problems 
To calculate the costs for all coalitions we have to solve 95 vehicle routing problems with time windows. 
This is because for each of the five working days in the planning period, there are 2
4-1 routing problems 
representing the non-empty coalitions that can be served by the LSP and four extra routing problems 
because for the 1-player coalitions also the scenario exists that the player rejects the insinking offer and 
performs the transportation himself. 
 
Orders are to be delivered to the stores between 8 am and 6 pm. The dataset shows that the number of 
deliveries per store per day is either 1 or 2. When stores are delivered twice a day, there is a morning 
delivery between 8 am and 1 pm and an afternoon delivery between 1 pm and 6 pm. To solve the 95 
vehicle routing problems with time windows (VRPTW) we use the heuristic of Bräysy et al. (2004). Details 
of the solutions to the routing problems can be found in Table 6.   18 
 
S  # Roll pallets  # Orders  Location costs  # Trucks  Total time  Transportation costs 
{A}-self  580  370  509  20  5,251  4,133 
{B}-self  716  244  743  28  11,161  7,043 
{C}-self  513  189  546  23  8,852  5,681 
{D}-self  1,758  585  1,841  45  16,345  10,794 
{A}  580  370  .  20  5,254  5,558 
{B}  716  244  .  28  11,519  7,161 
{C}  513  189  .  20  8,954  5,354 
{D}  1,758  585  .  44  16,114  10,597 
{A,B}  1,296  614  .  48  17,997  11,699 
{A,C}  1,093  559  .  45  16,314  10,783 
{A,D}  2,338  955  .  62  23,025  15,038 
{B,C}  1,229  433  .  44  17,630  11,097 
{B,D}  2,474  829  .  63  23,686  15,376 
{C,D}  2,271  774  .  51  20,590  12,914 
{A,B,C}  1,809  803  .  60  23,801  15,054 
{A,B,D}  3,054  1,199  .  78  29,383  19,056 
{A,C,D}  2,851  1,144  .  72  26,826  17,492 
{B,C,D}  2,987  1,018  .  74  28,566  18,306 
{A,B,C,D}  3,567  1,388  .  89  34,390  22,028 
Table 6: Routing results aggregated over five working days 
 
The  first  four  rows  of  Table  6  represent  the  cases  where  the  retailers  perform  the  transportation 
individually from their private FDCs, while for the other rows the service of the LSP is used. The location 
costs  and  the  transportation  costs  form  the  necessary  input  to  calculate  the  coalitional  values  from 
equation (3). Table 7 displays the structure of all coalitional values and the allocation over the retailers 
according to the Shapley value. Figure 4 depicts all paths from the 1-retailer coalitions to the grand 
coalition. Note that the percentage cost reductions in this figure are the quotient of the allocations given 
in Table 7 and the individual location and transportation costs of the retailers provided in the first four 
rows of Table 6. As mentioned earlier, a synergy claim of 0.2 is incorporated in the coalitional values.   19 
 
S   ( ) ∑
∈S i
i C0   ( ) S C   ( ) S v   ( ) v S, Φ  
{A}  4,642  5,558  0.0  (0.0; . ; . ; . ) 
{B}  7,786  7,161  500.0  ( . ;500.0; . ; . ) 
{C}  6,227  5,354  698.4  ( . ; . ;698.4; . ) 
{D}  12,635  10,597  1,630.4  ( . ; . ; . ;1,630.4) 
{A,B}  12,428  11,699  583.2  (41.6; 541.6; . ; . ) 
{A,C}  10,869  10,783  68.8  (-314.8; . ; 383.6; . ) 
{A,D}  17,277  15,038  1,791.2  (80.4; . ; . ; 1,710.8) 
{B,C}  14,013  11,097  2,332.8  ( . ; 1,067.2; 1,265.6; . ) 
{B,D}  20,421  15,376  4,036.0  ( . ; 1,452.8; . ; 2,583.2) 
{C,D}  18,862  12,914  4,758.4  ( . ; . ; 1,913.2; 2,845.2) 
{A,B,C}  18,655  15,054  2,880.8  (91.6; 1,473.6; 1,315.6; , ) 
{A,B,D}  25,063  19,056  4,805.6  (297.2; 1,669.6; . ; 2,838.8) 
{A,C,D}  23,504  17,492  4,809.6  (-61.1; . ; 1,771.7; 3,098.9) 
{B,C,D}  26,648  18,306  6,673.6  ( . ; 1,478.4; 1,938.8; 3,256.4) 
{A,B,C,D}  31,290  22,028  7,409.6  (265.9; 1,805.4; 1,907.5; 3,430.7) 






{A,B,C} {A,B,D} {A,C,D} {B,C,D}
2.0% 6.4% -1.3% .
18.9% 21.4% . 19.0%
21.1% . 28.5% 31.1%
. 22.5% 24.5% 25.8%
{A,B} {A,C} {A,D} {B,C} {B,D} {C,D}
0.9% -6.8% 1.7% . . .
7.0% . . 13.7% 18.7% .
. 6.2% . 20.3% . 30.7%
. . 13.5% . 20.4% 22.5%
{A} {B} {C} {D}
0.0% . . .
. 6.4% . .
. . 11.2% .
. . . 12.9%
 
Figure 4: Percentage cost reduction paths   20 
 
In practice the LSP will transfer the cost reductions to player  i  by means of a lower tariff 
S
i t  per roll 
pallet, depending on the coalition  S  that he serves. This tariff can easily be calculated from the cost 
reductions attributed to player  S i∈ and his demand  ( ) i D  in roll pallets: 
 









=                                                                                                                 (4) 
 
The development of these tariffs along the paths is shown in Figure 5. This shows that player D has by 








{A,B,C} {A,B,D} {A,C,D} {B,C,D}
7.85 7.49 8.11 .
8.82 8.54 . 8.81
9.57 . 8.68 8.36
. 5.57 5.42 5.33
{A,B} {A,C} {A,D} {B,C} {B,D} {C,D}
7.93 8.55 7.86 . . .
10.12 . . 9.38 8.85 .
. 11.39 . 9.67 . 8.41
. . 6.21 . 5.72 5.57
{A} {B} {C} {D}
8.00 . . .
. 10.18 . .
. . 10.78 .
. . . 6.26
 
Figure 5: Tariff paths 
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3.4  Negotiation and structure of sequential offers 
Negotiation takes place on a bilateral basis between the LSP and the individual retailers. Only the LSP has 
perfect information because he has calculated all coalitional values and knows the tariffs he is going to 
offer to each individual retailer. The retailers on the other side only know their own current and future 
tariff offers and have to make their accept/reject decision based on these private data. 
 
Figure 4 clearly shows that there are many paths along which retailers get a positive cost reduction at 
every step. It is however readily verified that the only three RSMPs are CBAD, BCAD, and BACD. Table 8 
shows that, according to the criterion proposed in section 2.3, CBAD is the best RSMP. 
 
  Certain gain  Sorted certain gain 
Path  A  B  C  D  Lowest  2nd  3rd  4th 
CBAD  2  13.7  11.2  27.2  2  11.2  13.7  27.2 
BCAD  2  6.4  20.3  27.2  2  6.4  20.3  27.2 
BACD  0.9  6.4  21.1  27.2  0.9  6.4  21.1  27.2 
Table 8: RSMPs sorted lexicographically according to the certain gains 
 
3.5  Discussion 
Table 7 shows that all coalitions, except {A}, have a positive value. This means that for almost every 
coalition the LSP can perform the orders more efficiently than the corresponding players can if they reject 
the offer and perform the orders individually. In particular, all retailers benefit when the grand coalition is 
reached, i.e., if all retailers accept the LSP’s insinking offer. In that case, the monetary savings attained 
from the synergy between the four retailers, are distributed as presented in Table 9. 
 
Retailer  Monetary gain  Percentage gain 
A  265.9  5.7 % 
B  1,805.4  23.2 % 
C  1,907.5  30.6 % 
D  3,430.7  27.2 % 
LSP  1,852.4  . 
Table 9: Distribution of monetary savings 
 
The LSP reserves 20% of the total savings, which provides him with a gain of 1852 EURO per week. This 
gain is used to cover the extra administrative (back office) costs and the costs of storage at the central 
FDC. The remainder is profit. Retailer D brings in the most orders and is rewarded for this by getting the 
largest  part  of  the  savings  from  cooperation  in  absolute  terms.  Retailer  C  however  gets  the  largest   22 
percentage cost reduction because his orders relatively exhibit most synergy with the other retailers. 
Figure 3 indeed shows that the stores of retailer C in a way glue together the geographical locations of 
the stores of the other retailers. 
 
An  important  decision  is  to  choose  in  which  of  the  24  possible  sequences  the  LSP  approaches  the 
retailers.  It  turns  out  that  in  the  case  at  hand  there  are  only  three  RSMPs,  implying  that  Shapley 
monotonicity is a quite discriminatory property  for  a path. Of the three RSMPs available, path CBAD 
performs best in this respect. This means that the LSP can best contact C first, then B, then A, and finally 
D. The virtue of an RSMP is that in every step along the path all committed players benefit when another 
player accepts the offer. This type of monotonicity makes that no committed player is harmed by the 
event that one of his competitors joins the cooperation. This is a very important condition for companies 
entering a co-operative relation. 
 
The small number of RSMPs encourages the insinking LSP to perform extra effort in the target group 
selection.  When  the  possibility  exists  to  pick  shippers  from  a  larger  set  than  the  LSP  can  effectively 
handle, he can proactively perform step 2 of the procedure on test groups of shippers and evaluate the 
number and quality of the RSMPs present. By doing so the LSP avoids targeting a group of shippers that 
may have great synergy potential, but no attractive RSMP to reach the grand coalition. As argued in 
section 2.3, the attractiveness of an RSMP depends on the minimum over all certain percentage cost 
reductions that are experienced by the players along the RSMP. 
 
By applying insinking, the LSP offers shippers the opportunity to considerably cut down transportation 
and location costs. In order to reap the maximum benefits, all involved parties depend on each other, 
which creates a beneficial lock-in that contributes to the probability of lasting success of the project. 
However, it should be noted that the numbers in Figure 4 represent the ‘ideal’ situation in which every 
player accepts the LSP’s offer. Although the clear initiative of the LSP makes his competitors less visible 
to the shippers, and insinking brings the retailers considerable cost reductions, still the retailers might 
have the strongest negotiation power. As a result, there is the chance that a retailer will (initially) reject 
the offer. In this case, the LSP still has some room for bargaining by decreasing his synergy claim for this 
specific retailer. When the LSP cannot persuade the retailer to accept the offer by lowering his synergy 
claim, the rejection is definitive. This retailer then has to be removed from the grand coalition. If for 
example on the best RSMP CBAD retailer C would reject the offer, the new grand coalition N’ becomes 
{A,B,D} and the insinking game is restricted to the subgame ( )
' , '
N v N . An identical analysis reveals that 
the best RSMP in this case would in fact be DBA, instead of the sequence BAD proposed by the original   23 
RSMP. If players further up the path reject the offer, no new negotiations with the already committed 
players will take place, although the negotiation plan with future players will have to be reconsidered. 
 
 
4  Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have introduced the so-called insinking procedure that LSPs can use to attract new 
customers and improve their market power. The given format for approaching the potential customers 
ensures that the LSP does not run financial risks and that his business proposals to all shippers are as 
good as possible. Customized prices based on each shipper’s actual contribution to the total synergy 
accomplish  a  fair  allocation  of  the  monetary  savings  from  the  cooperation.  The  procedure  uses  an 
operations research algorithm to calculate the value of every possible coalition of shippers, and a game 
theoretical solution concept to construct the customized tariffs.  
 
Insinking seems to be a viable alternative for the traditional outsourcing paradigm. With outsourcing the 
initiative for transferring the execution of transportation activities to an LSP lies with the shipper, and the 
occurrence of strong synergies with other shippers served by the LSP is more or less a matter of chance. 
With insinking however, the initiative lies with the LSP. He can use his market knowledge and experience, 
enriched  by  operations  research  techniques,  to  target  exactly  those  shippers  that  exhibit  strong 
synergies. Therefore, having the LSP in the driving seat seems natural because the LSP is the actor in the 
supply chain with the best competencies to exploit synergies in transportation systems. Moreover, the 
LSP  has  a  clear  economic  incentive  to  attract  as  many  shippers  as  possible  since  this  increases  his 
turnover and profit. Due to the property of Shapley Monotonicity, all parties involved benefit when the 
LSP attracts additional customers. 
 
From an organizational perspective insinking also has advantages compared to outsourcing, because it 
facilitates horizontal cooperation without the difficulties arising from the sharing of sensitive information 
between the cooperating companies. Open communication about the methodology and the consistent 
usage of an objective and fair game theoretical solution concept to allocate savings to shippers, make the 
LSP a trustworthy partner. In general, transportation is a hands-on and low-tech sector and practical 
cases  have  shown  that  practitioners  often  regard  the  problem  of  constructing  a  fair  gain  sharing 
mechanism as too difficult or academic. The insinking procedure has the advantage that this complex 
task now lies with only one actor who performs all necessary calculations and communication to the 
shippers. This avoids long and difficult rounds of discussion among the cooperating companies. 
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Although  the  calculation  of  customized  tariffs  for  new  customers  based  on  their  actual  synergy  with 
existing customers of an LSP seems quite logical from an economical point of view, tariff proposals by 
LSPs are often based on static rules of thumb, past prices and (conjectured) competitor prices. Modeling 
the problem as a cooperative game makes LSPs more aware of the actual value that a new customer 
creates for his business. The advantageous customer – service provider combinations that will result from 
applying a more sensible tariff quotation methodology will benefit both individual companies and society 
as a whole. 
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